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Abstract 
When examined from the point of view of the size of its population and economy, India is not well 
endowed with energy resources. Studies done by the Department of Atomic Energy indicate that even 
after exploiting full potential of every available source of energy including nuclear energy, India needs 
to continue to import energy resources. In this backdrop, an initiative was launched by Government of 
India to open up international civil nuclear commerce so as to enable India to access natural uranium 
from international market and to set up nuclear reactors in technical cooperation with other countries. 
The paper provides details of what has been done so far, ongoing steps and likely growth scenario for 
nuclear installed capacity in the country.  
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1. Introduction 
    As per statistics published by International Energy Agency, total electricity generation in India in 
2008 was 830 TWh and India is the fifth largest producer of electricity [1].  While total electricity 
generation looks impressive, this is not so when one looks at it in per capita terms as India’s population 
is now approaching 1.2 billion.  Average per capita electricity consumption in the world is about five 
times of that in India.  Also there is shortage of about 10% in both peak demand and in energy 
availability. When India is in midst of rapid economic transformation, electrical installed capacity 
infrastructure needs attention.   
    Electricity growth requirements have been a matter of concern and to look at the future, and to 
delineate role of nuclear energy, a study was conducted by Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to 
forecast growth over the next 50 years.  This study was completed in 2004 and the beginning of 10th 
plan i.e. 2002-03 was taken as the base year for the study.  The study is based on available projections 
about growth of economy and population and forecasts that by the middle of the century electrical 
installed capacity in India will be close to 1400 GW, which is about eight times the present installed 
capacity [2]. The study concludes that full potential of all energy sources  including nuclear should be 
exploited to ensure a robust growth of Indian economy.   
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    This study was followed by a study by Planning Commission of India which was published as a 
report titled Integrated Energy Policy [3]. Study by planning Commission projects electricity 
requirements based on two growth rates for Indian economy covering a horizon of three decades.    Fig. 
1 summarises forecast based on the study by DAE and also by Planning Commission.  There are 
differences in the forecasts made by the two studies, but both forecast a massive increase in installed 
capacity. Total electricity generation by the middle of the century as per DAE study looks very large, 
but per capita availability in the year 2052-53 is projected to be quite modest.  Fig. 2 gives growth in 
per capita generation based on DAE study.  Per capita generation in 2052-53 in projected to be 5,300 
kWh and this may be compared with present average per capita in OECD countries, which is about 
8,000 kWh. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.Scenarios for growth of total installed power capacity in India based on studies by Grover R B & Chandra S 
– 2004/2006 (DAE Study) [2] and Planning Commission-2006 (PC_GDP-Growth 8% and PC_GDP-Growth 9%) 
[3] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Growth in per capita electricity generation based on study by Grover R B & Chandra S – 2004/2006 [2]  
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India has a long way to go and has to aggressively plan to increase per capita electricity g eneration. 
Business as usual approach cannot work.  A large capacity addition viz., 78 GW by utilities and 12 GW 
by captive power plants, is planned in the ongoing 11th five year plan.  Target for 12th five year plan is 
expected to be above 100 GW.  The growth scenario makes it clear that India’s coal reserves are not 
going to last for more than five to six decades.  Total electricity generation potential of hydro and coal 
is quite modest and therefore, nuclear option needs close examination.  
2. Options for growth based on nuclear technology 
    India embarked on the development of nuclear technology right after independence in 1947, set up a 
swimming pool type research reactor APSARA in  
    1957, and followed it by a large (40 MWt) research reactor CIRUS in 1960. To jump start the nuclear 
power programme, two Boiling Water reactors were set up at Tarapur on turn-key basis and plans to set 
up first Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) were finalized in 1964. It was decided that PHWR 
would form the mains tay of India’s nuclear energy programme. Choice of PHWRs was dictated by the 
then available industrial infrastructure in the country. The fact that India has modest reserves of 
uranium and PHWR system is the best option to get maximum power from a given amount of mined 
uranium was also a consideration. It was also decided that India will follow a closed fuel cycle and 
recycle the plutonium recovered by reprocessing of spent fuel in fast reactors and research and 
development on fast reactors was started early in 1970s by setting up a dedicated research centre at 
Kalpakkam.  It was envisaged that pursuit of closed cycle approach would enable India to tap its vast 
thorium reserves for generation of nuclear energy.  
    India has unwaveringly pursued and continues to pursue closed fuel cycle approach.  Closed fuel 
cycle enables realization of full energy potential of uranium and reduces amount of high level waste 
generation per unit of electricity generated.  Moreover, thorium can be used for energy generation only 
by following a closed fuel cycle approach.  
    However, growth of electrical installed capacity based on closed fuel cycle depends on laws of 
Physics.  Breeding of plutonium in fast reactors depends on fuel type and immediate growth in installed 
nuclear capacity cannot come from fast reactors. For immediate growth, two options are available. The 
first option is pursue an aggressive programme to locate more uranium resources in the country , but this 
will take a while to realize the results  as locating uranium reserves, doing exploratory mining and 
opening new mines is an arduous task. The second option is to t ake policy initiatives to open up 
international trade in uranium and to import uranium and set up more PHWRs based on indigenous 
technology, or import uranium and set up Light Water Reactors (LWRs) in technical collaboration with 
other countries.  It is clear even when India imports uranium, it will continue to follow closed fuel cycle 
approach and recycle spent fuel in fast breeder reactors after reprocessing of spent fuel.  
3. Regime governing international nuclear trade and its relaxation to facilitate civil nuclear trade 
with India 
    However, pursuit of second option is not an easy task as nuclear trade is governed by a complex 
international regime developed over several decades. Immediately after the second world war it was 
realized that nuclear technology needs to be controlled as “The development of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes and the development of atomic energy for bombs are in much o f their course 
interchangeable and interdependent” [4]. The result of this thinking led to formulation of a Treaty on 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as NPT [5]. NPT divided the world in two 
parts, nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).  Only five countries 
which had exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967 were classified and NWS and the rest 
were forbidden from developing nuclear weapons. The treaty also enjoins upon NWS to eventually 
disarm and the asymmetry endorsed by the NPT was not intended to be permanent . However, no time 
table was set by the NWS towards disarmament and as it turns out NWS are in no hurry disarm or even 
to set a time table to do so.  This has been beautifully summed up by Mohammad Elbaradei, former 
Director general of the International Atomic Energy as “The early bird gets the nuke” [6]  
    Article III.1 of the NPT provides for application of safeguards “on all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or 
under its control anywhere.”  This led the NNWS parties to NPT conclude comprehensive safeguards   
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agreements with IAEA.  Article III.2 enjoins upon all parties to NPT to ensure that any nuclear material 
or nuclear equipment transferred to another state is subject to safeguards.  However, this was changed 
to require comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply by a group of cou ntries forming Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG). 
NSG guidelines for nuclear transfers [7] have several other elements as well and prior to modifications 
of the guidelines in 2008, for making any transfers to a state other than those classified as NWS by 
NPT, the following conditions had to be satisfied. 
 The recipient country must use the supplied items for peaceful purposes. 
 All nuclear material and facilities in the recipient country must be under comprehensive 
safeguards of the IAEA 
 Adequate physical protection must be provided to nuclear material and facilities  
 Retransfers can be made only with the approval of the supplier country  
    Several nuclear facilities in India are not under IAEA safeguards  and India has a declared strategic 
nuclear programme and therefore, India doesn’t satisfy these conditions.  To ensure that India is able to 
derive benefit from international civil nuclear trade, particularly natural uranium, a policy initiative was 
launched by the Government of India and the first step was to have a dialogue with several countries 
and agreements of cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy  were negotiated with those 
who were interested.  A separation plan was formulated and tabled in both the houses of Parliament  [8]. 
An India-specific safeguards agreement was negotiated with IAEA.  As a result of these steps, NSG 
relaxed its guidelines for civil nuclear trade with India on 6th September 2008 [9].  
4. Subsequent steps and the present status 
    Subsequently, inter-governmental agreements for cooperation were signed with France (30.09.2008), 
Russia (05.12.2008) and the USA (10.10.2008).  India-Specific Safeguards Agreement (ISSA) with 
IAEA was signed on February 2, 2009 and an additional protocol on May 15, 2009. Negotiations with 
other countries continued and agreements have since been signed with Namibia, Argentina, Canada, 
MoUs signed with UK & Mongolia and a broad based agreement with Russia. Good progress has been 
made with regard to finalizing the texts of agreements with Kazakhstan and Korea and one can expect 
more such agreements in future.  
    The main features of all these agreements are the following. 
 Cooperation is on the basis of the recognition of respective obligations . Implicit in this 
statement is the fact that India has no obligations flowing from treaties and arrangements to 
which it is not a party (NPT, CTBT etc). The cooperation is based on adjustment of 
international and national regimes to take into account India’s special status. 
 The Agreements take into account India’s requirement for assured fuel supplies. 
 While cooperation is for peaceful purposes, the Agreements would not affect India’s 
unsafeguarded nuclear activities. There is thus recognition that India has a military nuclear 
programme. 
 India’s right to use in both safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities nuclear material, non-
nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced or developed 
independent of any items transferred pursuant to the Agreements remain unaffected.  
 Implementing mechanisms have been provided to regulate transfer of nuclear material, non -
nuclear material, equipment and technology from cooperating countries to Indian entities. Such 
a mechanism is essential to protect India’s interest because requirement to give 
guarantees/assurances of peaceful use are possible only if the transfers are in accordance with 
set procedures.  
 Implementation of safeguards would be by IAEA and not through bilateral arrangements. 
Similarly physical protection measures would be in accordance with Convention on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and based on IAEA standards rather than on the 
basis of a bilateral understanding. 
 Agreements include upfront reprocessing rights for India taking into account the fact that 
international cooperation is meant to provide additionality to India’s three-stage programme.  
 Protection has been provided for India’s existing intellectual property.  
    The present status of international cooperation is as follows.  
 Separation plan is being implemented as per schedule. 
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 Natural uranium as well as enriched uranium has been imported and is being used in reactors 
under IAEA safeguards. 
 New sites for constructing reactors have been identified.  
 Export controls and physical protection regime was already in place; setting up of a Global 
Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership has been announced. 
 A resolution for implementing agreement of cooperation has been notified.  
 Techno-commercial negotiations are ongoing with several vendors. Vendors are also in 
negotiation with Indian industry for localization of supplies.  
5. Conclusion 
    Access to international uranium supplies will enable India to accelerate growth of nuclear installed 
capacity based on indigenous PHWR technology and also set up light water reactors  (LWR) in technical 
cooperation with other countries. When India embarked on PHWR programme, manufacturing of 
nuclear equipment in India resulted in a significant improvement in manufacturing capability o f Indian 
industry and now when India sets up LWRs in technical cooperation with other countries, this will 
further enhance manufacturing capability of Indian industry. It will also enable Indian industry to export 
nuclear equipment.   
    Increased availability of uranium and India’s unwavering support to pursuit of closed fuel cycle will 
lay a strong foundation for the growth of fast reactors thereby strengthening global energy security.  
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